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Abstract
Popular support for enlargement of the European Union is a function of how close or how far
removed the member states are from the candidate countries. In the absence of country fixed
effects or special bilateral relationships (e.g. adjacency, historic rivalry, religious conformity),
we can explain approximately 14% of the variation in attitudes across member states and with
regard to specific candidate countries using factors related to trade, distance, and relative
economic size and structure. Taking special bilateral relations into account we can explain
approximately 30%. Once country fixed effects are incorporated, the level of explanation
increases to 80%.
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Public Opinion and Enlargement: A Gravity Approach
Popular attitudes within existing member states are important for the success of enlargement.
Whether the example is the sequence of Irish referenda – first negative and then positive – the
parliamentary debate in the Netherlands, or the offhand comments of the President of the
European Convention, what is clear is that public opinion matters. What is less clear is how
public opinion is structured. This is true particularly with reference to the attitudes of specific
member states toward specific candidate countries. We can make assertions about the
sentiments of the French toward the Romanians or the Germans toward the Poles, but there is
almost no literature positing a universal set of propositions about how one country should be
expected to view another.
The closest that the literature comes to offering a set of principles can be found in the work by
Karl Deutsch (et al. 1957: 36). Deutsch argued that lasting communities of integration rely on:
a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling,’ trust, and mutual
consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of
mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in
accordance with it – in short, a matter of perpetual dynamic process of mutual
attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process
of decision-making.
Much of this is difficult to capture directly. Nevertheless, the argument can be simplified for
analysis. As Rosamond (2000: 44) suggests, ‘the guiding hypothesis of transactionalist work
on integration [like Deutsch’s], was that a sense of community  among states would be a
function of the level of communication between states.’ The assumption is that interaction
breeds familiarity which in turn promotes the ‘we-feeling’ or attitudinal sympathy that
Deutsch believed to be a key to success. Hence Deutsch’s work became identified as the basis
for the ‘affinitive’ strand of the ‘transactions approach’ to the study of integration.
The standard critique of Deutsch’s work rests on two propositions. First, the data concerning
the attitudes in one country toward integration with another simply did not exist, making
impossible even a superficial rendering of the principal hypothesis that interaction promotes
popular support. Instead, Deutsch focused primarily on the measurement of interaction rather
than on the affective change that such interaction brought about. Second, even with an
affective change, there is no guarantee that popular support will result in successful
integration. Too many intervening variables and institutions stand in the way between popular
opinions and political outcomes.
Our contribution addresses only the first concern – the problem of  operationalising the
underlying hypothesis that transaction (or interaction) promotes a change in popular attitudes
or affinities. Using a relatively new series of public opinion data within specific member
states regarding enlargement to specific candidate countries we look to see whether
geographic distance, trade importance, relative prosperity, and economic structures play a role
in shaping attitudes. What we find is that a three-variable model can explain approximately
14% of the variation in attitudes within specific member states toward specific candidateJONES & VAN DER BIJL
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countries – such as the variation between French, German, and Italian attitudes toward the
accession of Romania, or the variation between French attitudes toward Romania and toward
Poland. Moreover, with the addition of dummy variables to represent special bilateral
relationships – such as adjacency, historic enmity or friendship, or religious conformity – we
can increase the level of explanation to approximately 30%. Finally, the introduction of
dummy variables to account for country-specific fixed effects not only allows us to
demonstrate the robustness of our model, but also brings the level of explained variation up to
around 80%.
Such findings do not put to rest all of the criticisms relating to the work of Deutsch and
others. However, given the variety of countries involved in any future Europe and the
manifest importance of constructing a sense of community between them, these findings do
suggest that the time may be ripe for a reconsideration of the affinitive strand of the
transactions approach to integration.
The Data and the Model
In contrast to the late 1950s, when Deutsch was writing on integration in the North Atlantic,
the Eurobarometer now systematically publishes the results of a survey in which respondents
from each member state are asked to declare their support, opposition, or non-response in
relation to the accession of each of the potential candidate countries. During the first years of
this survey, the list of potential candidates was quite long. By the end of the 1990s, however,
it had narrowed down to approximately thirteen.
1 This is our measurement of national
affinity.
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The approach that we use in analysing this data is based on the ‘gravity’ model that is widely
deployed to analyse trade patterns. This model is characteristically dyadic, which is to say that
it focuses on pair-wise relations between countries. Typically, the dependent variable used in
a gravity model measures the flow of goods or factors from one country to another. On the
right-hand side of the equation, the gravity approach includes measures for income and
populations in both countries as well as the relative distance between them. These
independent variables are arrayed in product form and the estimation is log-linear (cf.
Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985).
For our purposes, the dependent variable is the attitudes (ATTij) of specific member states
(subscript i) toward specific candidate countries (subscript j). Because respondents have three
choices in response to the Eurobarometer question, we analyse three separate components of
attitudes: support (SUPij); opposition (OPPij); and non-response (DKNij).
On the right-hand side of the equation, we focus on ratios or relative measures of income and
population rather than the absolute measures favored in the traditional gravity approach. The
justification for using ratios derives from the reflective nature of public opinion as opposed to
the directive nature of international trade: Our prior is that the attitudes in member states are
not actually drawn to the candidate countries as the gravity metaphor would suggest but rather
focus on assessments of relative size and importance. Moreover, since relative income size
                                                
1 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Turkey. Some surveys also include results for Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, but those are not
included in the analysis here. The survey for 1997 omitted Turkey.
2 Importantly, we do not have to massage the data in order to create a consistent series. The pollsters working for
Eurobarometer asked respondents to address a single question throughout the period of our analysis: “For each
of the following countries, would you be in favor or against it becoming part of the European Union?” We
simply assembled those responses into a pooled cross-section time series.PUBLIC OPINION AND ENLARGEMENT
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and relative population size are highly correlated (suggesting problems of collinearity), we
have aggregated relative income and population into one variable for relative income per
capita (PCAPij) which is the ratio of the per capita income in the candidate country to the per
capita income in the member state. This relative per capita income variable is our measure of
transactions potential.
In addition, we include separate ratios for the value of exports from the member state to the
candidate country as share of the member state’s total exports and we include a measure of
the distance between the capitals of the member state and the candidate country. These
variables are also highly correlated and so we combine them into a single ratio of trade over
distance ( TBDij). This trade-over-distance variable is our principal measure of actual
transactions.
Finally we include a variable to capture the countervailing influence of redistributive
institutions at the European level and specifically the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Deutsch’s argument did not consider that enlargement would have automatic distributive
consequences arising from structural features unrelated to either actual or potential
transactions. The reality of the European Union is more complicated. Therefore, we have
included the ratio of the agricultural share of total employment of the candidate country
relative to the agricultural share of total employment in the member state ( AGGij). This
variable captures an important negative consequence of the enlargement process, which is the
threat that the candidate countries pose to the size and functioning of the CAP. This prior is
elaborated in greater detail below.
3
The general model for our estimation of the problem is as follows:
ATT pcap tbd agg U ij ij ij ij ij = + + + + a b b b 1 2 3 (1)
As written, those variables in upper case are in ratio or nominal form, while those variables in
lower case are in log form. The error term (Uij) is normally distributed around zero.
4
Estimation Strategy and Theoretical Expectations
The three components of attitudes – support, opposition, and non-response – are obviously
interrelated insofar as they sum to 100% of respondents.
5 Hence in establishing the theoretical
                                                
3 The data are readily available. The source of our public opinion data is the Eurobarometer polling previously
cited and culled from volumes 45, 47, 49, 51 and 53 of the published annexes of statistical tables. The data for
GDP per capita and value added in the agricultural sector comes from the European Commission’s  Annual
Macroeconomic Database. The trade data is from the Direction of Trade Statistics of the International Monetary
Fund. And the geographic data is constructed from the  National Geographic. A copy of the entire dataset is
available upon request from the authors.
4 The model specification is based on curve-fitting rather than strong a priori motivations. The gravity model is
typically estimated as log-linear. We made estimates using percentages on the left-hand side of the equation and
ratios on the right-hand side; logs on both sides; and percentages on the left-hand side with logs on the right-
hand side. Of the three specifications, all provided strong estimates but the third consistently offered the highest
level of explained variation. Therefore in the estimates that we report, the percentages of popular attitudes are
expressed as a function of the logs of relative income, relative trade share over distance, and relative agricultural
size.
5 This boundedness also means that standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques will produce
biased estimates of the coefficients on our independent variables. Therefore, we have used a weighted least
squares (WLS) regression technique in order to derive minimum chi-squared estimates of the coefficients
(Greene 1993: 653-655). These estimates are based on a recalculation of the dependent variable into logits (to
escape from its original boundedness) and an initial estimation by OLS (in order to generate the weights for the
WLS). Because the initial weights are estimated from the model, with every change in the model we haveJONES & VAN DER BIJL
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expectations, it is important not to over-determine the outcome by anticipating each variable
to play a distinctive role with respect to each component. Even where the statistics show that
to be the case, it is always conceivable that at least one partial correlation will be the spurious
result of the other. A summary of expectations is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Theoretical Expectations
SUPij OPPij DKNij
pcapij  +  - ?
tbdij  + ?  -
aggij  -  + ?
Note: The value of those relationships marked by “?” is determined by the balance between the other two
relationships.
List of Variables:
SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i
pcapij is per capita income in candidate j relative to member state i
tbdij is relative importance of exports to candidate j from member state  i divided by the distance between the
capitals of the two countries
aggij is agriculture share of employment in candidate j relative to member state i.
Relative GDP Per Capita (pcapij)
Relative income per capita is important for two reasons. The first relates to transactions
potential. Simply put, the presumption is that respondents will see more advantages to
developing closer economic relations with relatively rich candidates than with relatively poor
candidates. Therefore, the expectation is that support will correlate positively with relative
income per capita and opposition will correlate negatively. The relationship between this
variable and non-response rates is indeterminate.
The second importance of relative income per capita is institutional and arises from the fact
that per capita income is the trigger for the allocation of regional and structural funds. In
broad terms, countries with lower per capita income are net beneficiaries of these funds and
countries with higher per capita incomes are net contributors. Therefore, the expectation again
is that support among the member states will decline for relatively poor candidate countries
and increase for relatively wealthy candidate countries. Reciprocally, opposition should
increase for relatively poor countries and it should decrease for relatively wealthy ones. There
is no general proposition to suggest a relationship between relative per capita income and
non-response.
Trade Importance Divided by Distance (tbdij)
Trade importance and distance are correlated insofar as countries which are geographically
closer should be expected to trade more heavily with one-another. In terms of attitudes,
however, these two factors should be expected to have different influences. Relative trade
importance should have a positive impact on support for accession and a negative impact on
opposition because membership can only be expected to strengthen the economic relationship
between the member state being polled and the candidate country in question. The expectation
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in terms of non-response rates is indeterminate. By contrast, distance should have a powerful
and positive influence on non-response rates which in turn should lower both support and
opposition. The reciprocal of distance should be negative in terms of non-response rates and
positive in terms of support and opposition. Taken together, therefore, the combined variable
of trade importance divided by distance should have a strongly positive influence on support
(where the two factors work in tandem), a more ambiguous influence on opposition (where
the two factors work in against each other), and a strongly negative influence on non-response
rates (where the negative impact of the distance reciprocal should be expected to predominate
over the indeterminate impact of trade importance).
Relative Importance of National Agricultural Production (aggij)
The relative importance of agriculture is institutionally determined by the structure of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and by the underlying desire in some member states to
protect agricultural markets. In terms of the CAP, candidates with a relatively large
agricultural sector should be expected to draw upon relatively large agricultural supports.
Hence the expectation is that this ratio will correlate negatively with support and positively
with opposition for the candidate’s accession. The relationship between the relative
importance of agriculture and the level of non-response is indeterminate.
The role of market competition reinforces these expectations. Existing agricultural producers
will have a reinforcing aversion to enlargement toward candidates that are also large
agricultural producers. Here again the expectation is that the relative importance of agriculture
will correlate negatively with support and positively with opposition. The relationship with
non-response is again indeterminate.
Preliminary Empirical Results
The results of the estimation correspond closely with the theoretical expectations. In summary
form the data suggest that:
•  Respondents in the member states are more likely to be supportive and less likely to be
opposed to candidate countries with relatively high income per capita;
•  support also increases with the relative importance of the candidate country as an export
market for the member state or as the relative distance between the capitals of the two
countries diminishes;
•  an increase in the distance between the capitals of the member state and candidate country
corresponds with a rise in non-response rates; and
•  the relative size of the agricultural sector decreases support and increases opposition.
These estimates are summarised in Table 2. Because of the model specification (see notes),
the values of the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Only the sign (+/-) and the statistical
significance are relevant for our purposes.JONES & VAN DER BIJL
6
Table 2. Empirical Results, 1996-2000 (Weighted Least Squares)
N=945 SUPij OPPij DKNij
CONSTANT 0.74
(5.6)
-0.93
(-6.3)
-2.55
(-25.4)
pcapij 0.09
(2.6)
-0.16
(-4.1)
0.09
(3.4)
tbdij 0.06
(6.9)
0.01
(1.1)
-0.10
(-15.9)
aggij -0.10
(-4.1)
0.10
(3.8)
0.02
(1.0)
ADJUSTED R
2 0.12 0.11 0.23
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  All coefficients with a t-statistic above 2 (or less than -2) are significant at
the conventional 5% threshold.  Those with a t-statistic above 2.6 (or less than -2.6) are significant at the 1%
threshold.  Coefficients in boxes are expected to be ‘spurious’ even though they may be statistically
significant at a high threshold.
List of Variables:
SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i
pcapij is per capita income in candidate j relative to member state i
tbdij is relative importance of exports to candidate j from member state i divided by the
distance between the capitals of the two countries
aggij is agriculture share of employment in candidate j relative to  member state i.
The level of explained variation differs across the three components of popular attitudes from
a high of 23% in reference to non-response rates to a low of 11% in reference to opposition.
When this explained variation is aggregated in proportion to the actual level of response in
each category – over the period, being 43% support, 34% opposition, and 23% non-response –
it is possible to conclude that 14% of attitudes can be explained as a result of the model.
This high level of explanation is surprising insofar as much of the theoretical expectations are
predicated upon data or upon relationships that are unlikely to be wholly transparent to public
opinion. The assumption that respondents will have significant knowledge of the relative
income per capita or agricultural size of thirteen different countries is difficult to support
empirically. The assumption that respondents will be able to translate this knowledge into an
estimation of projected EU financial flows is still more difficult to support. Hence much of
the theoretical argument so far rests upon the presumption that even a vague understanding of
economic and demographic structures of the candidate countries is sufficient to drive attitudes
toward enlargement. The next step in our analysis is to test the robustness of this presumption.
Special Relationships
Our preliminary empirical results reveal only part of the story.  Where countries already have
preconceived attitudes toward one-another as a result of historical interaction or participation
in some larger community, we would expect popular attitudes to differ markedly from our
very simple underlying model. By the same token, where interaction between countries is
very intense, it is possible that this interaction will have negative as well as positive
implications, generating rivalry and antipathy instead of affinity.  The question is whether
such pre-existing relationships can account for much of the explanatory force of the variables
for trade-by-distance, relative income per capita, or agricultural employment.PUBLIC OPINION AND ENLARGEMENT
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In order to capture such divergences from the underlying model, we introduce an array of
dyadic dummy variables as place-holders for special relationships. These variables are dyadic
in the sense that they operate on a pair-wise basis (i.e. matching specific member states to
specific candidate countries) and they are dummy variables in the sense that they represent
performance relative to the model. If we change the underlying model, the significance of
these variables will change as well.
We tested an array of variables but settled on five that have the most intuitive appeal –
common borders, Greece-Turkey, Greece-Cyprus, Catholic countries, and Nordic-Baltic
states. We thought to test for linguistic similarity, but found virtually no instances beyond the
cases of Greece-Cyprus and Finland-Estonia both of which are already accounted for in the
dummies we selected. We also thought to test for religious affinity more broadly, coding
countries as Orthodox and Protestant as well as Catholic, however, the absence of a coherent
overarching hierarchy in either the Orthodox or Protestant cases makes this ‘common
religion’ variable less intuitive than a Catholic variable on its own. Finally, we tried a variable
pairing Austria and Germany with the Czech Republic in order to accept the possible
influence of remaining controversy over the postwar Benes decrees. However this variable did
not emerge as significant in any of our regressions and so we chose to discard it from the final
analysis.
The theoretical expectations for these variables are straightforward with the exception of
common borders. The variable for Greece-Turkey should show relatively low support and
high opposition because of the historic conflict between these countries. The variable for
Greece-Cyprus should show high support and low opposition because of the strong cultural
links between Greece and the Greek part of Cyprus. The Catholic variable should show high
support and low opposition on the presumption that Catholics share a common identity
centred on the Church. And the Nordic-Baltic variable should show high support and low
opposition because of the close relations between these countries.  In none of these cases do
we have an expectation about the influence of ‘special relationships’ on non-response rates.
The variable for common borders is more problematic because it suggests two contrasting
interpretations. Within the context of Deutch’s theory, we should expect the common border
variable to pick up positive externalities from close interaction. In that case, the existence of a
common border should operate in much the same manner as the trade-by-distance variable,
increasing support and decreasing non-response rates. Within the context of the model,
however, the common border variable may pick up only negative externalities – associated
with fear of the ‘other’, cross-border crime, rivalry, etc. This might result because most of the
positive externalities associated with intense interaction will already have been captured in the
trade-by-distance variable. Hence the statistical outcome would be a decrease in support and
an increase in opposition associated with the common border – holding the relationship with
non-response rates to be indeterminate. The theoretical expectations for the whole of the array
are summarised in Table 3.
The empirical results correspond broadly with our theoretical expectations. To begin with, the
array of ‘special relationships’ improves the capacity of the model to explain variation in
attitudes considerably. The adjusted-R
2 increases from a weighted average of 0.14 to 0.30.
Moreover, this increase in explained variation does not come at the expense of the underlying
model. Each of our three main independent variables maintains the appropriate sign in
relation to the attitudes expressed and in some cases the precision (or statistical significance)
of the estimate is enhanced. These results are presented in Table 4.JONES & VAN DER BIJL
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Table 3. Theoretical Expectations – Special Relationships
SUPij OPPij DKNij
Common Borderij  + / - ? / + - /?
Greecei-Turkeyj  -  + ?
Greecei-Cyprusj  +  - ?
Catholicij  +  - ?
Nordici-Balticj  +  - ?
Note: The value of those relationships marked by “?” is determined by the balance between the other two
relationships.
List of Variables:
SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i
Common Borderij is shared border between member state i and candidate j
Greecei-Turkeyj is member state Greece and candidate Turkey
Greecei-Cyprusj is member state Greece and candiate Cyprus
Catholicij is both member state i and candidate j have majority Catholic populations
Nordici-Balticj is member state i is Nordic and candidate j is Baltic.
Table 4. Empirical Results with Special Relationships, 1996-2000 (Weighted Least Squares)
N=945 SUPij OPPij DKNij
CONSTANT 0.86
(6.3)
-0.92
(-5.7)
-2.6
(-23.0)
pcapij 0.13
(4.2)
-0.21
(-5.7)
0.10
(3.9)
tbdij 0.06
(6.7)
0.02
(1.5)
-0.10
(-14.2)
aggij -0.11
(-5.4)
0.09
(3.9)
0.04
(2.3)
Common Borderij -0.29
(-3.3)
0.27
(2.7)
0.11
(1.5)
Greecei-Turkeyj -1.35
(-5.0)
1.52
(5.2)
-0.84
(-3.5)
Greecei-Cyprusj 1.64
(6.6)
-1.45
(-4.3)
-1.24
(-5.5)
Catholicij -0.22
(-6.3)
0.07
(1.8)
0.21
(7.1)
Nordici-Balticj 0.89
(11.7)
-0.92
(-9.6)
-0.21
(-3.1)
ADJUSTED R
2 0.34 0.25 0.30PUBLIC OPINION AND ENLARGEMENT
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  All coefficients with a t-statistic above 2 (or less than -2) are significant at
the conventional 5% threshold.  Those with a t-statistic above 2.6 (or less than -2.6) are significant at the 1%
threshold.  Coefficients in boxes are expected to be ‘spurious’ even though they may be statistically
significant at a high threshold.
List of Variables:
SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i
pcapij is per capita income in candidate j relative to member state i
tbdij is relative importance of exports to candidate j from member state i divided by the
distance between the capitals of the two countries
aggij is agriculture share of employment in candidate j relative to  member state i
Common Borderij is shared border between member state i and candidate j
Greecei-Turkeyj is member state Greece and candidate Turkey
Greecei-Cyprusj is member state Greece and candiate Cyprus
Catholicij is both member state i and candidate j have majority Catholic populations
Nordici-Balticj is member state i is Nordic and candidate j is Baltic.
In terms of the specific ‘special relationship’ variables, the results support our theoretical
expectations with only one exception. The variables for Greece-Turkey, Greece-Cyprus, and
Nordic-Baltic relations all yield the expected signs at very high levels of statistical
significance. Greek support for Cyprus and Nordic support for Baltic candidates both
outperform the expectations of the model. Greek support for Turkish membership is much
below what the basic model would predict. Meanwhile, the outcome for the common border
variable is to generate lower support and higher opposition than the basic model would
predict. This seems to conform with the expectation that most of the positive effects of
interaction on national affinities have been accounted for by the trade and distance variable.
The results for the Catholic variable are both surprising and counterintuitive. Catholic
member states show less (and not more) support for Catholic candidate countries than the
underlying model would predict. We have no explanation for this outcome. However, as the
variable is highly significant we have retained it for further analysis.
Country Fixed Effects
The second step in evaluating the robustness of the model is to consider the differences
between countries. The principal objective of the modelling exercise is to develop an
understanding of the structure of national attitudes in terms which are divorced from national
idiosyncrasy. However, it would be illusory to pretend that national idiosyncrasy does not
exist or that it is not important in the attitudes that the people of one country may hold toward
another. Therefore we introduced an array of (monadic) country specific variables to capture
the fixed effects of specific member states or candidate countries. As with the dyadic
variables that we used to capture special relationships, these country-specific dummies reveal
performance in relation to the model.
In the testing of multiple country fixed effects, we deployed two different strategies for
selecting the countries to ignore.
6 In a first iteration we ignored the role of the smallest
                                                
6 In our preliminary analysis of country fixed-effects we introduced each country dummy in turn in order to
assess whether any given country could obviate the observed relationships in our model. The result was
reassuring. With the exception of Austria (as reported in the text), no individual country predominated over any
general effect. Therefore, we turned our attention to the problems posed by the whole array of country fixed
effects. As we have no theoretical prior for singling out countries, the array lies at the center of our findings. The
difficulty is that – for statistical reasons – not all countries can be included in the array at the same time. TheJONES & VAN DER BIJL
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countries – Luxembourg among the member states and Malta among the accession countries.
In the second iteration we ignored the role of the largest countries in both samples – Germany
and Poland. Because of its unique position in the enlargement process, we retained the
dummy for Turkey in both iterations. The results of these two trials very similar and so only
that which ignores Germany and Poland is reported in Table 5.
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Table 5. Empirical Results with Country Fixed-Effects, 1996-2000 (Weighted Least Squares)
Panel A. Dyadic (Pair-wise) Variables
N=945 SUPij OPPij DKNij
CONSTANT 0.03
(0.2)
-0.68
(-5.0)
-1.81
(-19.3)
pcapij -0.00
(-0.0)
-0.02
(-0.4)
0.05
(1.5)
tbdij 0.04
(4.5)
-0.02
(-2.4)
-0.03
(-5.1)
aggij -0.00
(-0.1)
0.00
(0.1)
0.00
(0.4)
Common Borderij 0.19
(3.6)
-0.07
(-1.2)
-0.10
(-2.5)
Greecei-Turkeyj -1.62
(-10.2)
1.56
(9.9)
-0.54
(-4.3)
Greecei-Cyprusj 1.54
(10.3)
-1.68
(-9.3)
-0.87
(-7.2)
Catholicij -0.11
(-3.4)
0.12
(3.5)
0.02
(0.8)
Nordici-Balticj 0.65
(10.9)
-0.60
(-8.7)
-0.31
(-6.6)
Adjusted R
2 0.79 0.80 0.83
Note: Country fixed effects are presented in Panel B. t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients with a t-
statistic above 2 (or less than -2) are significant at the conventional 5% threshold.  Those with a t-statistic
above 2.6 (or less than -2.6) are significant at the 1% threshold.   Coefficients in boxes are expected to be
‘spurious’ even though they may be statistically significant at a high threshold.
List of Variables:
SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i
pcapij is per capita income in candidate j relative to member state i
tbdij is relative importance of exports to candidate j from member state i divided by the
distance between the capitals of the two countries
aggij is agriculture share of employment in candidate j relative to  member state i
Common Borderij is shared border between member state i and candidate j
Greecei-Turkeyj is member state Greece and candidate Turkey
Greecei-Cyprusj is member state Greece and candiate Cyprus
Catholicij is both member state i and candidate j have majority Catholic populations
Nordici-Balticj is member state i is Nordic and candidate j is Baltic.
                                                                                                                                                        
dummy variables representing at least one member state and one candidate country must be left out of the
analysis.
7 This choice may seem curious – why ignore large countries instead of small? The answer is that we choose to
remove the fixed effects of smaller countries because we believe these are more likely to distort the analysis
overall.PUBLIC OPINION AND ENLARGEMENT
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Panel B. Monadic (Country Specific) Variables.
N=945 SUPij OPPij DKNij
Member States
Austria -0.21*** 0.07 0.13**
Belgium 0.12* 0.06 -0.14***
Denmark 0.77*** -0.52*** -0.43***
Finland 0.56*** -0.44*** -0.15***
France -0.06 0.05 -0.03
Greece 0.89*** -0.67*** -0.34***
Ireland 0.48*** -1.17*** 0.70***
Italy 0.56*** -0.66*** 0.12**
Luxembourg 0.23*** 0.09 -0.21***
Netherlands 0.95*** -0.71*** -0.42***
Portugal 0.42*** -0.91*** 0.50***
Spain 0.85*** -1.52*** 0.54***
Sweden 0.90*** -1.23*** 0.22**
United Kingdom 0.32*** -0.73*** 0.50***
Candidate Countries
Bulgaria -0.36*** 0.27*** 0.19***
Cyprus -0.09 -0.09 -0.03
Czech Republic -0.11* -0.04 0.13***
Estonia -0.30*** 0.22*** 0.17***
Hungary 0.13** -0.15** -0.03
Latvia -0.33*** 0.23*** 0.20***
Lithuania -0.31*** 0.20*** 0.19***
Malta 0.23*** -0.28*** 0.01
Romania -0.43*** 0.39*** 0.12**
Slovakia -0.29*** 0.20*** 0.17***
Slovenia -0.41*** 0.30*** 0.18***
Turkey -0.68*** 0.66*** 0.10*
Adjusted R
2
(memorandum)
0.79 0.80 0.83
Note: * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level.
Variables: SUPij is support for the accession of candidate j by member state i
OPPij is opposition to the accession of candidate j by member state i
DKNij is non-response in relation to candidate j by member state i.
Any direct interpretation of the coefficients on specific country fixed effects is difficult to
make with certainty. To begin with, we have no strong theoretical prior as to which
expression(s) of attitudes will be most affected – support, opposition, or non-response.
Therefore we have little basis for distinguishing between meaningful and spurious
correlations. We may notice that Austria appears less supportive of enlargement in relation to
the model than any other member state or that Turkey attracts substantially less support in
relation to the model than any other candidate. Yet the statistical analysis of country fixed
effects adds little beyond such suggestions.JONES & VAN DER BIJL
12
The implications for the model as a whole are more easily substantiated. The inclusion of the
array of country fixed effects variables forces us to reconsider the importance of relative per
capita income in the determination of member state attitudes about enlarging the European
Union to particular candidate countries. We have no clear explanation for this outcome except
to suggest that our presumption that a vague understanding of relative income is sufficient to
drive attitudes for the reasons we outlined is incorrect or overdrawn. The same reasoning
applies to the variable for the relative importance of agriculture in total employment. Again,
as our theoretical expectations were predicated upon somewhat unrealistic information
requirements, the mitigation of this statistical relationship is unproblematic (and indeed
vaguely reassuring).
The model is clearly more successful in terms of actual (as opposed to potential) transactions.
The variable for trade over distance retains its expected sign and a high level of statistical
significance. Trade and distance play a strong role in determining relative levels of support
and non-response rates.
Geographic contiguity remains important as well. Once country-fixed effects are
incorporated, the dummy variable for common borders changes sign but retains a high
statistical significance. Moreover the relationship resembles that for the trade-by-distance
variable. Our explanation for this change is that what we had originally interpreted as the
negative externalities of adjacency were actually the country-fixed effects of Austria, the
country which accounts for the greatest number of common borders. Once the Austrian fixed
effects are separated out, the remaining influence of common borders is positive – as
Deutsch’s theory would suggest.
8 However, the fact that Austria is less supportive of
enlargement than the model would predict may be due to the existence of strong negative
externalities arising from its adjacency with many of the candidate countries.
Conclusion
This analysis of public opinion and enlargement provides strong evidence that a link between
popular affinity and economic interaction does exist. Using a gravity model that incorporates
variables for trade and distance as well as relative economic structures, we can explain
approximately 14% of the variation of attitudes within specific member states toward specific
candidate countries. By expanding the analysis to include the effects of historic relationships,
we can increase the explained variation to 30%. And with the incorporation of dummy
variables for country-specific fixed effects, the cumulative explained variation increases to
80%. At the same time, the importance of structural variables within the basic model
diminishes leaving only those variables related to trade and distance as statistically
significant.
The empirical contribution of this study does not address all of the criticisms that have been
made of the affinitive strand of the transactions approach to integration theory. Our findings
leave open two alternative pathways for research. One concerns affective outcome of
interaction between countries – why do trade and distance matter in public opinion? Authors
like Deutsch and others have posited a number of explanations and yet these remain to be
tested. The second pathway for research lies in understanding why public opinion matters for
the stability of a more pluralistic European Union. Our objective has so far been limited to
                                                
8 Austria is not the only source of the negative coefficient on adjacency. The Greece-Turkey relationship is
important as well. In earlier iterations of our research, we included only country fixed effects and common
borders but not the full array of dyadic relationship dummies. The coefficients on common borders remained
persistently negative and with a high level of statistical significance.PUBLIC OPINION AND ENLARGEMENT
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understanding what shapes attitudes between countries. Clearly, however, that is only part of
the larger story at work.
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